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Panel III:  Restricting Speech on the 
Internet:  Finding an Appropriate 
Regulatory Framework 
395 
Moderator: Andrew B. Sims* 
Panelists: Parry Aftab, Esq.** 
 Lisa M. Fantino, Esq.*** 
 Richard A. Kurnit, Esq.**** 
 Robert W. Peters, Esq.***** 
 Barry Steinhardt, Esq.****** 
MR. SIMS: Good afternoon.  I am Professor Andrew Sims.  
Our third panel of this symposium is entitled Restricting Speech on 
the Internet:  Finding an Appropriate Regulatory Framework.  We 
have some fabulous and very knowledgeable panelists for you to 
enjoy. 
Our first speaker is Richard Kurnit, a partner in the law firm of 
Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & Selz.  He has discussed the regulation 
of pornography on the Internet at other symposia,1 and he repre-
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York, 
N.Y.  Amherst College, B.A. 1970; Harvard Law School, J.D. 1973. 
** Partner, Aftab & Savitt, P.C., Paramus, N.J.  Hunter College, B.A. 1981; New 
York University School of Law, J.D. 1984. 
*** Reporter/Writer, WCBS-AM Radio, New York, N.Y.  Pace University, B.A.; 
Syracuse University, S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, M.S. 1983; Pace 
University School of Law, J.D. 1997. 
**** Partner, Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & Selz, P.C., New York, N.Y.; Member of 
Faculty (Advertising Law), Parsons School of Design.  Columbia College, A.B., magna 
cum laude, 1972; Harvard Law School, J.D., cum laude, 1975. 
***** President, Morality in Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.  Dartmouth College, 
B.A., cum laude, 1971; New York University School of Law, J.D. 1975. 
****** President, Electronic Frontier Foundation, New York, N.Y.; Associate Di-
rector, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, N.Y. (1990-1998).  Goddard College, 
B.A. 1975; Northeastern University School of Law, J.D. 1978. 
1. See Mike Godwin, Richard A. Kurnit, et al., Regulating the Internet: Should Por-
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sented Prodigy in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co..2  
Following Mr. Kurnit, Lisa Fantino will give her remarks.  She is a 
reporter and writer for the CBS’s flagship radio station: WCBS-
AM in New York City.  Ms. Fantino will be followed by Barry 
Steinhardt, who chaired the Cyber Liberties Task Force for the 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and has been very ac-
tive in coordinating the ACLU’s campaigns to keep cyberspace 
free from censorship.  You also will hear from Robert Peters, 
president of Morality in Media.  In that capacity, he works to com-
bat illegal hard-core pornography and uphold decency standards in 
the media.  Parry Aftab will be our final speaker this afternoon.  
She is a well-known attorney who has written extensively on cy-
berspace and technology law, including the recently published 
book A Parent’s Guide to the Internet: How to Protect Your Chil-
dren in Cyberspace.3 
Each panelist will speak for several minutes on the issue.  After 
all of the panelists have presented, we will have a roundtable dis-
cussion and open the floor for questions from the audience.  Thank 
you and I would like to present Rick Kurnit. 
MR. KURNIT: As a starting point to a discussion of regulation 
of the World Wide Web we must understand that it is not like the 
Wild West.4  The rule of law is very much available to those who 
venture onto the Internet.  The issue is not how to regulate, but 
whether to add regulations to the existing body of laws:  criminal 
as well as private rights of action that already are in place.  To the 
extent that there is frustration about lawless activity, it is the diffi-
culty of apprehending culprits in an anonymous and free floating 
environment and the fact that, with no cost or barrier to entry into 
the marketplace, the culprits are often judgment proof.  More regu-
lation will not answer those problems.  Nevertheless, it is ill ad-
 
nography Get a Free Ride on the Information Superhighway?  A Panel Discussion, 14 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343 (1996). 
2. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). 
3. PARRY AFTAB, A PARENT’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET:  HOW TO PROTECT YOUR 
CHILDREN IN CYBERSPACE (1997). 
4. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista, 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass. 1997); 
Nicholas W. Allard & David A. Kass, Law and Order in Cyberspace: Washington Re-
port, 59 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 569 (1997). 
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vised to succumb to the impulse to hold liable the more or less in-
nocent bystanders who have the means to pay a judgment. 
Let us look at the private rights of action that already regulate 
the content of the Internet and the degree to which they reach the 
on-line service provider or other responsible parties.  On-line mate-
rial may give rise to all of the potential liability faced by conven-
tional publishers and advertisers.  These include copyright, trade-
mark, publicity rights, privacy rights, and defamation. 
All existing copyright protections are applicable to the Inter-
net.5  There is not likely to be any significant exception carved out 
of the law of copyright infringement in order to facilitate the new 
media.  Thus, there is a very real risk of being held liable as a con-
tributory infringer even where you have not originated the offend-
ing material.6  All that is necessary to establish liability for con-
tributing to infringement by another is knowledge of the copyright 
infringement and significant help or assistance.7  Therefore, merely 
providing the server into which the infringing material is stored 
and facilitating transmission to others may be sufficient assistance, 
requiring only proof of knowledge of the infringing nature of the 
material to establish liability.8  Thus, in the few cases decided to 
date on this issue, courts have held that the operators of computer 
networks can be held liable for acts of copyright infringement by 
users of the networks, even when the operators do not participate 
in the acts of infringement or intend to infringe copyright.9 
In Playboy Enterprises v. Frena,10 the defendant was the op-
erator of a subscription computer bulletin board service (“BBS”), 
accessible via telephone modem to customers.11  The BBS in-
cluded unauthorized copies of 170 photographs, in which the plain-
tiff Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (“Playboy”) owned the copyright, up-
 
5. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 107 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998); see also Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
6. See Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-13 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997). 
7. See id. at 514. 
8. See Religious Tech., 923 F. Supp. at 1231. 
9. See Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
10. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
11. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
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loaded by customers from their home computers.12  Customers of 
the BBS could browse and download the computerized copies of 
the photographs and store the copied image from the host computer 
in their home computer.13 
Although the defendant in Playboy stated that he never himself 
uploaded or downloaded the copyrighted photographs, and re-
moved the unauthorized copies from the BBS as soon as he was 
sued by Playboy, the court nonetheless held him liable for copy-
right infringement.14  The display of the copyrighted photographs 
over the computer network constituted “public distribution” of the 
photographs and therefore infringement of Playboy’s exclusive 
right, as the copyright owner, to distribution.15 
In Sega Enterprises v. Maphia,16 the court held the operators of 
a BBS, whose customers could also upload and download material 
between the host computer and their own computers, liable for 
copyright infringement.17  The BBS in Sega contained unauthor-
ized copies of plaintiff Sega Enterprises’ (“Sega”) copyrighted 
video games, which were uploaded and downloaded by customers 
of the BBS.18  There was evidence that the defendants encouraged 
and even solicited customers to download games, and charged fees 
for downloading privileges or required customers to upload games 
in exchange for downloading other games.19  Consequently, the de-
fendants directly profited from the infringement.  The court held 
that the unauthorized copying of the video games, that is, upload-
ing and downloading the games, by customers was copyright in-
fringement and that Sega’s role in the copying—including provi-
sion of facilities, direction, knowledge, and encouragement—
constituted contributory copyright infringement.20  The court found 
it was irrelevant that the defendants did not know exactly when the 
 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. Id. at 1556. 
15. Id. at 1556-57. 
16. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
17. Id. at 686. 
18. Id. at 683. 
19. Id. at 683-84. 
20. Id. at 687. 
PANEL3.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
1998] SYMPOSIUM—RESTRICTING SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 399 
programs would be uploaded or downloaded by customers.21 
Given the unsettled state of the law, we generally recommend 
that to reduce exposure, wherever appropriate take steps to ensure 
downloading of files is difficult or impossible and include an on-
line copyright notice.22  A claim of infringement of another’s copy-
righted work may lead to an award of damages as well as attorneys 
fees.23  It is the copyright owner’s option to collect either actual 
damages, which in this context would be difficult for a plaintiff to 
prove, or statutory damages, that is, damages fixed by statute in the 
range of $200 to $100,000 per infringement.24 
Generally, courts award statutory damages in the lower portion 
of this range for innocent infringers.25  The higher amounts are 
awarded only in exceptional cases involving willful infringers.26  
Willfulness requires an alleged infringer’s knowledge that certain 
conduct is infringing.27  Because it is unlikely that a copyright 
owner will be able to prove substantial actual damages from cus-
tomers’ infringement, your precautionary measures can influence a 
court to view you as, at most, an innocent infringer, hence liable 
only for statutory damages at the lower end of this range. 
Now, on to trademarks.  The Lanham Act prohibits the use of 
another’s trademark, symbol, or name in a way that falsely sug-
gests the affiliation, connection, association, or sponsorship by that 
person of the alleged infringer’s goods or services.28  Specifically, 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes liability on the in-
fringer.29 
 
21. Id. at 686-87. 
22. See generally Mary Ann Shulman, Internet Copyright Infringement Liability; Is 
an Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a Dance Hall Operator, 27 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 555, 596-600 (1997) (discussing online access provider liability). 
23. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504, 505 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
24. See id. § 504. 
25. Cf. Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
trial courts take innocence into account when fixing statutory damages because they are 
“equitable in nature”). 
26. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1995); Peer 
Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336-1337 (9th Cir. 1990). 
27. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1010-11; Peer Int’l, 909 F.2d at 1336 n.3. 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
29. Section 43(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
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Generally, liability under the Lanham Act will arise from the 
use of others’ trademarks, symbols, or names in a manner that 
falsely or misleadingly suggests that the owner of the mark spon-
sors or otherwise is associated with your goods or services.30  
Thus, if others’ trademarks are used in a manner that may suggest 
a tie-in, it is advisable to get permission from the trademark owner.  
It is also advisable to use other entities’ trademarks in their full and 
proper form, not distorted or manipulated in any way, in order to 
avoid claims based on dilution of trademarks.31 
To be held liable for contributory infringement, you must be 
found to “knowingly cooperate in illegal and tortious activity.”32  
Therefore, although it is unlikely that customers will infringe the 
trademarks of others in the context of a chat service or bulletin 
board, if you are aware of such an infringement and you do not de-
lete the infringing material, you may be held liable for your cus-
tomers’ trademark infringement.33  In the event of a claim of this 
nature, you could take the position that given the volume of mate-
rials that appear in a chat service or on a bulletin board, you could 
not have known of or prevented any trademark infringement.34  If, 
however, a determination is made to monitor chat services and bul-
letin boards for other purposes—such as obscenity, racial epithets, 
defamation, or copyright infringement—and in the process you 
gain knowledge of materials which infringe the trademarks of oth-
 
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil ac-
tion by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be dam-
aged by such an act. 
Id. 
30. See Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
31. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1996). 
32. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25.02 (4th ed. 1997). 
33. See Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-15 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997); Sega Enters., 857 F. Supp. at 686-87; Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 
1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
34. See Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 509-10. 
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ers, you risk liability for contributory infringement.35 
Now, on to the right of publicity.  The right of publicity per-
mits anyone to sue for unauthorized use of his or her name or like-
ness in advertising.36  But the First Amendment limits the extent to 
which state law claims for violation of the rights of publicity and 
privacy can be based on the use of a name or likeness in connec-
tion with information, news, and other editorial content.37  Thus, 
state statute and common law requirements for permission to use a 
person’s name or likeness are generally limited to use for trade and 
advertising.38 
Advertising is basically defined as a communication whose 
principal purpose is to propose an economic transaction.39  Edito-
rial content is traditionally defined in terms of the control exercised 
by the editorial staff of the publication.40  Alternatively, the dis-
tinction is made between a paid media insertion, namely, an adver-
tisement, and the content of the publication which is generated by 
the staff of the publication or by freelance writers who are paid for 
the right to include their material in the publication.  A conven-
tional magazine contains editorial content, in which permission to 
use a person’s name or likeness is not necessary, side by side with 
advertising where the use of a name or likeness must be with per-
mission.  The same principles apply to electronic media.41 
A New York court addressed this issue in electronic media in 
Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corp.,42 which concerned adver-
 
35. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (cit-
ing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)); Gershwin 
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
36. See Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 63 N.Y.2d 379 (1984). 
37. See Zaccini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
38. See Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 699-700 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1995). 
39. See id. at 696, 701 
40. See id. at 698. 
41. See id. at 698-699 (“Because Stern’s name was used by Delphi to elicit public 
debate on Stern’s candidacy, logically subsequent use of Stern’s name and likeness in the 
advertisement is afforded the same protection as would be a more traditional news dis-
seminator engaged in the advertisement of a newsworthy product.”). 
42. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1995). 
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tising by an on-line service for one of its chat lines.43  The chat line 
concerned Howard Stern (“Stern”), a talk-show personality who 
was running for Governor of New York at that time.44  The court 
held that this advertising was incidental to the editorial content of 
the on-line service, hence it was permissible under New York 
law.45 
The key holding is the determination that the chat line itself, 
which permitted subscribers to use Stern’s name in discussing 
Stern and his candidacy, was editorial content fully protected by 
the First Amendment.46  The court, citing the leading case that 
deals with on-line services, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,47 
agreed that an on-line service, even one where only paid subscrib-
ers may access the information services, is like a book store or a 
letter to the editor column in a newspaper.48  No permission is nec-
essary to use the name of an individual in connection with such 
material.49  This of course goes to the chat service aspect of the de-
fendant’s service as opposed to a web site’s editorial material, but 
a publisher’s own editorial material is certainly entitled to the same 
protection as the letters to the editor.50 
There is one case recognizing that the news and information 
aspects of on-line services are entitled to the same protection as 
newspapers.51  Courts have gone pretty far in holding that just 
about any information is entitled to this protection.  Perhaps the 
most dramatic instance involved a holding in which the court 
found that pictures illustrating a book entitled World Guide To 
 
43. Id. at 695. 
44. See id. at 695-696. 
45. Id. at 697-698. 
46. See id. at 701 (stating that “affording protection to on-line computers services 
when they are engaged in traditional news dissemination . . . is the desirable and required 
result”). 
47. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
48. Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
49. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140 (“A computerized database is the functional 
equivalent of a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower 
standard of liability to an electronic news distributor . . . than that which is applied to a 
public library, book store or news stand would impose an undue burden on the free flow 
of information.”). 
50. See id.; Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
51. See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 340 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). 
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Nude Beaches constituted newsworthy matters of public interest 
and prohibited any claim for invasion of privacy.52  Thus, the edi-
torial material contained on-line, including chat lines, should be 
entitled to the same protection as the editorial content of a maga-
zine. 
The key issue would be to distinguish the advertising material 
from the editorial material.  Just as a magazine contains articles of 
public interest next to advertisements so might a web site.  The 
challenge here is to keep the advertising messages separate from 
the editorial content.  Thus, even “advertorial” sections included in 
a magazine are deemed to include advertising and articles, al-
though the articles are clearly approved by the advertiser or the 
sponsor of the “advertorial” as being conducive to the advertising 
they wish to attract.  The reader’s ability to distinguish articles 
from advertisements is crucial.53 
In the leading case, New York Magazine had a feature each 
week called Best Bets, which featured items available for sale in-
cluding the store location and the price.54  The New York Court of 
Appeals held that it was editorial material under the control of the 
editors of the magazine and not an advertisement in disguise, thus 
defeating the claim by a model who was wearing a jacket depicted 
in such an announcement.55  Therefore, under New York law, even 
an article about a product that extols the virtues of the product may 
be treated as an editorial and not an advertisement, where the mate-
rial is not a paid media insertion or otherwise under the control of 
the manufacturer or the entity proposing a commercial transac-
tion.56 
A World Wide Web site that constantly and conspicuously de-
picts the logo of the sponsor may be viewed as being more like an 
infomercial than a typical medium of communication which con-
tains editorial material and separate advertising material.  Conse-
quently, in developing such a web site, it is important to think 
 
52. See Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 496 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220-221 (App. Div. 
1985) (prohibiting a claim for invasion of privacy). 
53. See Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
54. See Stephano v. Newsgroup Publication, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 582 (N.Y. 1984). 
55. Id. at 585. 
56. See id. at 585-86. 
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about the overall means of distinguishing the editorial content from 
the advertising message.  Specifically, a web site developer should 
plan how to present logos, plugs, and commercial messages in or-
der to avoid blurring the distinction between the editorial substance 
and the advertising messages.  It is also important to develop the 
means for prohibiting advertising from bulletin boards and chat 
lines. 
Now, on to defamation.  Generally, defamation is the oral or 
written publication to third parties57 of a false statement of fact 
about a person or business that causes the person or business to 
suffer reputational injury.58  Ordinarily, “one who repeats or oth-
erwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he 
had originally published it.”59  In the context of libel, which are 
written as opposed to spoken defamatory statements, courts have 
traditionally distinguished between most distributors of materials 
containing defamatory material and publishers.60  “[Most] courts 
have long held that vendors and distributors of defamatory publica-
tions are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know of 
the defamation.”61  This requirement that a distributor have knowl-
edge of the defamation is rooted in the guarantees of freedom of 
speech and of the press contained in the First Amendment.62 
Sponsorship or operation of a chat service or bulletin board 
service raises significant, and as yet unresolved, issues of liability 
under defamation law.  Because the very purpose of chat and bulle-
tin board services is to permit customers to post messages and en-
gage in dialogue,63 as in the Playboy Enterprises v. Frena64 action, 
 
57. That is, parties other than the person making the defamatory statement, or the 
person or entity that is the subject of the defamatory statement. 
58. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
59. Cianci v. New York Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). 
60. See id.; see also Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
61. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139 (quoting Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521 
F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
62. See id. 
63. See Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law; Inde-
cency on the Internet:  Constitutionality of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 463, 505 (1997) (discussing chat room ser-
vices); Niva El Kin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Su-
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customers might commit acts of copyright infringement in posting 
messages, or in uploading material on-line.65  Thus, you may wish 
to monitor or screen the services for copyright and trademark in-
fringement issues and delete infringing material.  You may also 
wish to (1) monitor the services for obscenity, racial epithets, and 
the like, (2) delete offensive material, and (3) prevent users from 
interfering with operation of the service or from harassing other 
users.  This very monitoring, however, might expose you to liabil-
ity for defamation.66 
Two decisions addressed whether the operator of a bulletin 
board or chat service is a distributor as opposed to a publisher—
both suggesting that the degree of editorial control exercised by the 
operator will be the determinative factor.  In Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc.,67 the defendant CompuServe, Inc. (“Compu-
Serve”) contracted with a company not affiliated with Compu-
Serve, to “manage, review, create, delete and otherwise control the 
contents of its Journalism Forum68 in accordance with editorial and 
technical standards and conventions of style as established by 
CompuServe.”69  The court found CompuServe to be in the posi-
tion of a distributor, rather than a publisher, and therefore not li-
 
perhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 346, 347 n.5 (1993) (defining bulletin boards and their use). 
64. 982 F. Supp. 503 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
65. See Kin-Koren, supra note 63 (discussing potential liability for uploading and 
downloading material online); see also John F. Delaney & Adam Lichstein, The Law of 
the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Internet Case Law and Legal Developments, 505 
PLI/PAT. 79, 94 (1998) (discussing Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 
1996)). 
66. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).  The court held that service monitors who choose 
to monitor and edit the content of their services should be viewed as publishers rather 
than distributors and thus should be subject to greater liability.  Id.  Congress voiced its 
displeasure with the decision by passing the Communications Decency Act, which re-
moved disincentives for Internet service providers who choose to police themselves.  See 
47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No 105-165, Mar. 20, 
1998); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (dis-
cussing the swift legislative response to the decision in Stratton Oakmont). 
67. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
68. CompuServe’s on-line services include a series of forums that serve the needs of 
specific user groups by providing bulletin boards, computer file libraries, and other ser-
vices. 
69. Id. at 137 (citation omitted). 
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able for republication of defamatory statements unless it knew or 
had reason to know of the defamation.70  Once CompuServe de-
cided to carry a publication, it had little or no editorial control over 
that publication’s contents, particularly when the publication was 
carried as part of a forum managed by a company unrelated to 
CompuServe.71 
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,72 the court 
found the defendant Prodigy Services Co. (“Prodigy”) was a pub-
lisher and could be held liable for republication of a defamatory 
statement, even without knowledge or reason to know the state-
ment was defamatory.73  The critical difference between Compu-
Serve and Prodigy, and the reason behind the court’s determination 
that Prodigy was a publisher, rather than a mere distributor, was 
that Prodigy had undertaken to monitor the bulletin board ser-
vice.74  The court relied on the following evidence to hold that 
Prodigy was a publisher. 
First, the court relied on the fact that Prodigy promulgated 
“content guidelines” which requested users to refrain from posting 
“insulting” or “harassing” notes or those that were in “bad taste” or 
“grossly repugnant to community standards” or “harmful to main-
taining a harmonious on-line community.”75  Prodigy stated it 
would remove such messages when they were brought to Prodigy’s 
attention.76  Second, the court relied on Prodigy’s use of screening 
software that automatically pre-screened all bulletin board postings 
for offensive language.77  Third, Prodigy’s use of Board Leaders 
to, among other things, enforce the content guidelines was noted 
by the court.78  And finally, the court acknowledged the use of an 
“emergency delete function,” which enabled a Board Leader to 
remove a message posted and send to the message poster a notice 
 
70. Id. at 141. 
71. See id. at 140. 
72. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). 
73. Id. at *6. 
74. See id. at *10. 
75. Id. at *5. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. 
78. See id. 
PANEL3.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
1998] SYMPOSIUM—RESTRICTING SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 407 
of explanation, ranging from solicitation to bad taste to insulting.79 
My firm was retained by Prodigy following this decision.  We 
moved for renewal and reargument in order to correct the factual 
record.  Prodigy in fact did not edit the bulletin board as the plain-
tiff claimed.  Prodigy’s policing was limited to mechanical screen-
ing of obscenity and offensive words and, after material was 
posted, the policing of off-topic postings and illegal conduct, such 
as harassment and obstruction of the functioning of the bulletin 
board. 
We contended that this limited policing is not tantamount to 
editing.80  We argued that a publisher, for purposes of liability for 
defamation, must include the adoption or endorsement of an au-
thor’s statement.  It is the reader’s assumption that the publisher 
elected to publish the specific statement that contributes to the in-
jury.  It is the opportunity to evaluate an author’s statements and 
the author’s reliability that gives a true publisher the chance to 
avoid the injury.  Thus, without the suggestion of adoption or en-
dorsement or the practical opportunity to evaluate the substance of 
the statement or the author’s reliability, there is no publisher for 
purposes of defamation liability.  Therefore, the operator of a bul-
letin board service should not be subject to liability for defamation 
merely because that operator policed illegal conduct, obscenity, 
fighting words, “time, place, and manner,” but not the substantive 
content, that is, the truth or falsity of statements. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996,81 which contained pro-
visions attempting to address indecency on the Internet,82 also con-
tained a provision intended to override Stratton Oakmont.83  In 
what has been called the “Good Samaritan Defense,” it provides 
that actions taken by providers of Internet services to police inde-
 
79. Id. at *6. 
80. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Misut v. Mooney, 475 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
81. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at scattered sections 
of 15 & 47 U.S.C. (Supp. 1997)). 
82. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 
Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 230, 560-561 (West 1998 & Supp. 
1998)). 
83. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c). 
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cent, violent, or otherwise objectionable material cannot be consid-
ered in determining whether a provider is liable as a publisher for 
information that was put up on their system by others.84  The cases 
since the statute was enacted appear to suggest that it will work to 
minimize the tendency to hold liable those you can apprehend for 
the wrongful acts of others.85 
Now, on to fraud and false advertising.  The Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) had made absolutely clear that the full force 
of laws prohibiting false advertising and fraud is applicable to the 
Internet.  Numerous actions have been instituted against the worst 
offenders and this activity will only increase as commerce on the 
Internet becomes increasingly significant. 
As to indecency.  Other panel members will address the subject 
of pornography and sex, the one area where commerce on the 
Internet has flourished most.  But allow me one observation; the 
White House has recognized that, given the worldwide scope of 
the web, governmental regulation must be international to be truly 
effective.  Given this additional reality, what can be gained by add-
ing governmental oversight to the individual control, responsibil-
ity, and enforcement of rights that the law already provides?  
Given the rapidly changing technology, the ever-increasing capa-
bility of users to control what is in fact accessed, and the slow pace 
of the legislative process, any proposals for additional regulations 
or laws must be scrutinized in terms of real benefit.  We must be 
careful not to enact legislation merely because of frustration aris-
ing from the reality that this technology makes publishers, as op-
posed to pamphleteers, out of individuals who may be difficult to 
locate, let alone hold accountable. 
MR. SIMS: Thank you.  Ms. Fantino is next. 
MS. FANTINO: I come to this discussion wearing many hats: 
former schoolteacher, veteran journalist, and newly admitted attor-
ney.  Instructing children, informing adults, and defending rights 
are tenets I live by, and I do not believe they should suffer at the 
expense of the First Amendment in cyberspace.  Our forefathers 
seem to have been more enlightened more than two hundred years 
 
84. See id. 
85. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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ago at guarding our liberty to speak freely in whatever form than 
today’s legislators, who are hesitant to take baby-steps in adapting 
to new technology as it leaps past them. 
It is the dawn of a new millennium and today’s adults are giv-
ing birth to the leaders of the next century, all converging in a one-
wire world, where your television is not only your source of enter-
tainment but it’s also your computer monitor, Internet connection, 
pager, and telephone.  It is communications on a global, even ga-
lactic scale, considering that we can now talk to space shuttle as-
tronauts orbiting the Earth through the Internet.  The Internet has 
become a weapon of mass instruction and it would be a mistake to 
silence its influence in a world that is trying to promote democ-
racy, especially when there are already numerous legislative and 
technological safeguards in place. 
Right now, the United States is the lone superpower and the 
world is looking to us, as the standard-bearer of free speech, to see 
how we handle the Internet.  If we were to place restrictions on 
what can and cannot be said over the Internet, what kind of mes-
sage would that send to repressive governments such as China, 
which prohibits the importation of modems and satellite dishes?86  
We are fortunate in that we only have to run down to our local Ra-
dio Shack store or electronics chain to buy this equipment. 
The Internet was developed thirty years ago under the auspices 
of the United States Defense Department in an effort to allow 
computer and science experts to share experiences, ideas, and dis-
coveries in a high-tech communications world.87  It was designed 
to outlast a nuclear holocaust to enable the free flow of information 
to continue.88  It has since expanded into a commercial vehicle 
where anyone can log onto the World Wide Web.89  The implica-
tions of such a universal communications tool are overwhelming.  
Interestingly enough, the government that gave birth to the Internet 
 
86. See Scott E. Feir, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: China’s Great Wall, 
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 361. 
87. See Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & the Internet: Confounding the Borders 
of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 
188 (1997). 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 188-89 
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is now trying to bridle its wild child, where, it has been said, anar-
chy reigns.90 
While Congress recognizes the international scope of the Inter-
net and other interactive computer services as providing a unique 
opportunity for cultural and intellectual exchanges in addition to 
avenues for political discourse,91 it is trying to control what can be 
said between adults who take affirmative steps to use such ser-
vices, generally within the confines of their own homes.  Yet the 
first congressional effort to reign in the masses through the Com-
munications Decency Act92 failed with a resounding dismissal by 
the Supreme Court, which saw the statute as an overly broad at-
tempt to censor indecent speech.93 
Free speech in the United States has become more of a pro-
tected speech than the unbridled ability to say whatever whenever.  
While the framers of the Constitution were intent on promoting the 
free marketplace of ideas through the guaranteed liberty of all 
United States citizens to express themselves,94 judicial interpreta-
tion has modified the plain language of the First Amendment over 
the course of time.  The United States Supreme Court has limited 
certain forms of speech to time, place, and manner restrictions, 
while prohibiting Congress from imposing content-based regula-
tions that impede that freedom.95  The Communications Decency 
Act of 1996,96—part of the larger Telecommunications Act of 
199697—was an unconstitutional expansion of federal authority, 
abridging what has been deemed a fundamental personal right.98 
 
90. See Robert F. Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There’s a Chill on the 
Internet: The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communica-
tions, 29 GA. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1996). 
91. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 86 (1996). 
92. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
93. See Reno v. ACLU, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
94. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 93 (1984). 
95. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992). 
96. Pub. L No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 230, 560-561 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)). 
97. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (Feb. 8, 1996) (codified at scattered sections 
of 15 & 47 U.S.C. (Supp. 1997)). 
98. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
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Congress overreached in the Communications Decency Act by 
attempting to suppress free expression under the guise of prevent-
ing child exploitation through computers, which is an act already 
prohibited by federal criminal statutes.99  The government has a le-
gitimate purpose in seeking to protect the interest of its young citi-
zens but not at the expense of the fundamental freedoms of 
adults.100  The conduct they sought to prohibit in the Communica-
tions Decency Act, to ban the use of interactive computers for any 
request, proposal, or other communications to minors that de-
scribes sexual or excretory functions or organs,101 is already pun-
ishable under the Child Sexual Exploitation Protection Act.102  In 
fact, the criminal sanctions under that statute go further in assuring 
society protection from offenders, by providing for longer jail 
terms than those allowed by the Communications Decency Act.  
The legislative purpose of censorship in the Communications De-
cency Act already can be achieved more effectively absent censor-
ship and by means substantially narrower to achieving the legiti-
mate governmental interest of protecting minors from sexual 
exploitation.103  It thereby failed the requirement of narrow tailor-
ing for any content-based regulations.104 
Restrictions on obscenity, however, have been upheld by the 
Supreme Court when an offending expression, which taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex in a patently offensive 
way and lacks any literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.105  
Yet the Supreme Court, in Miller v. California,106 had a difficult 
time setting forth any national standards for obscenity.  Instead, the 
 
99. See Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251, 
2252 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
100. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 
101. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230. 
102. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-225, 92 Stat 7 (Feb. 6, 1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (West, 
WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 105-165, Mar. 20, 1998)). 
103. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346-48. 
104. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1988); see also Shea v. 
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 940-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (declaring the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996 to be an overly broad restraint on protected communication between 
adults). 
105. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
106. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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Court left it to jurors in the forum community to apply a contempo-
rary local standard of morality and for state legislators to set forth 
specific sexual conduct they deemed to be pornographic within 
their jurisdiction.107 
Although we are one nation, we are too culturally diverse to 
expect a national standard to apply to all communities.  In Miller, 
the Court admitted that to do so would be an exercise in futility.108  
Imagine then, what it would be like to apply a global standard of 
morality where some nations permit and encourage bigamy, nu-
dity, and the like.  What may be accepted behavior on the streets of 
Times Square will not necessarily sit well in the Mormon commu-
nities of Utah.  It would be an insurmountable task to monitor the 
Internet with cyber cops.  The Communications Decency Act’s at-
tempt to sanitize the Internet of indecency would homogenize the 
unprecedented information exchange taking place in cyberspace. 
The right to voice opinions, expressions, and the like is not 
confined to the isolation of a person in solitary confinement where 
the only voice heard is his own.  The activity of interpersonal 
communication is so fundamental to the educational and develop-
mental process of human interaction that society’s future depends 
on a robust exchange in the marketplace of ideas.  The way to 
promote the growth of the evils that live among us is to send them 
underground where they can fester unobserved.  Is it not better for 
parents to monitor the activities of their children and foster in them 
some responsibility, rather than forcing them to seek knowledge in 
the lure of the forbidden?  Today’s parents tend to expect legisla-
tion to pick up the slack for the lack of the so-called quality time 
they spend being involved in the development of their children. 
Limiting the dissemination of allegedly indecent material on 
the Internet restricts the adult population to exchanging material 
only suitable for children, thereby stunting the development of so-
ciety.  Even such restrictions, when applied to obscene material 
with which minors may have contact, have been staunchly over-
turned by the Supreme Court as manifestly against conditions nec-
 
107. Id. at 30. 
108. Id. at 30-31. 
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essary for the maintenance and progress of a free society.109  Al-
though it has been noted that First Amendment protections do not 
apply to obscene materials, adults within the confines of their own 
homes have been shielded from the invasion of governmental con-
trol over their private reading materials.110 
Little is more secluded than sitting in the privacy of your own 
home and turning on your computer to read, to write, or to browse 
the Internet.  In Stanley v. Georgia,111 the Supreme Court held that 
while states have a right to regulate obscenity, they do not have the 
power to infringe on an individual’s primary liberty of freedom of 
expression behind closed doors.112  Legislatures, therefore, have 
the difficult task of protecting the interests of children while simul-
taneously preserving the individual rights at the core of the Consti-
tution. 
The Internet is not an intruder.  We invite it into our home.  
Just like the cable user described in Cruz v. Ferre113 or the dial-a-
porn user outlined in Sable Communications v. FCC,114 the Inter-
net explorer must make a monthly decision whether to continue his 
subscription to the Internet and, if dissatisfied, he may cancel his 
subscription at any time.115  The Internet explorer is a pilot chart-
ing his own course.  By virtue of the subscription-only access, in-
nocent bystanders cannot be offended by the chance confrontation 
of indecent material, nor can children too young to read or write be 
able to access World Wide Web sites without the knowledge to 
type commands that will get them there. 
Parents must take deliberate steps to bring the Internet and all it 
contains into their homes, thereby purposefully exposing their 
children to its contents with full knowledge of its global reach.  
The parents are the gatekeepers of the message and can easily 
 
109. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989); see also Butler 
v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (finding that a law banning dissemination of books to 
general public, based upon protection of minors, was an unreasonable restriction on the 
fundamental liberties of a free society). 
110. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
111. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) 
112. Id. 
113. 755 F.2d 1415, 1419 (11th Cir. 1985). 
114. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
115. See Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420. 
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close the door to the world if they so choose. 
Because content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, 
the Sable Court looked at other ways to protect minors from expo-
sure to indecent material.  The Sable Court found that alternatives 
existed which were less restrictive than an outright ban, and held 
that cutting adult access to indecency is not narrowly tailored to 
meet the government’s goal.116  As the judicial view shifts the onus 
from the industry to parents to the industry again, in keeping a safe 
harbor for children to mature, perhaps the best solution would be to 
split the responsibility between the rapidly developing industry and 
the guardians of our young citizens. 
Several alternatives have been explored, some with high suc-
cess rates and others which are not as feasible in the current mar-
ket.  Time channeling for sensitive material, which has been up-
held by the courts in narrow applications,117 is not workable in a 
medium like the Internet, where both senders and receivers are lo-
cated in different time zones and can simultaneously transmit or 
access information.  Restricted use, on the other hand, is much 
more practicable as a shared responsibility between the industry 
and parents without placing a tremendous economic burden on ei-
ther.  Selective screening and blocking programs are currently 
available and do not require any extensive modifications to exist-
ing industry or home equipment. 
The industry voluntarily developed screening computer pro-
grams to assist parents in limiting access by minors to questionable 
sites on the Internet.  Programs, such as CyberPatrol from Micro-
systems Software, work by screening out access to questionable 
Web sites as rated by PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Se-
lection: a ratings systems developed by major commercial content 
providers.118  Other screening programs, such as SafeSurf, focus on 
child-friendly sites, again as rated by the software program devel-
oper.119 
 
116. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129. 
117. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
118. See Farhan Memon, How to Keep Your Children Away from this Stuff?, N.Y. 
POST, Feb. 8, 1996, at 28. 
119. See id. 
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The screening programs place more control in the hands of 
parents and allow them to supervise, directly or indirectly, their 
children’s use of the Internet.  Only the most ingenious minors 
with computer expertise far beyond the knowledge of the ordinary 
parent or adult will be able to hack their way through the blocking 
software.  Screening software allows parents, who so desire, to 
shield their children from questionable material while simultane-
ously providing adults access to the unrestricted, constitutionally 
protected so-called indecent sites.  It is the least restrictive method 
available to meet the government’s dual purpose of preserving our 
nation’s fundamental liberty of protected speech and shielding the 
nation’s youth from indecency.120 
If it is United States policy to preserve the vibrant market of 
the Internet, to maximize user control over what information is re-
ceived by individuals, and to encourage industry development of 
filtering technologies to empower parents, then a censorship provi-
sion seems to defeat the goal.  Placing shutters on the marketplace 
of ideas is not the way to keep material from seeping through the 
floorboards.  Perhaps today’s parents are looking to Congress to 
legislate away responsibility that is part and parcel of rearing chil-
dren. 
It is doubtful our founding fathers had planned on usurping pa-
rental authority in child rearing when setting forth the foundation 
of protected speech.  Rather, it can be argued that the framers 
sought to firmly establish paternal protectionism by encouraging 
the marketplace of ideas and leaving it to parents to present it to 
their children in terms they see fit and at the appropriate time in 
their development.  What better way to ensure the continuation of a 
freethinking society than by allowing an uncensored exchange of 
ideas between generations to come on a global basis. 
PROF. SIMS: Thank you.  Now, Mr. Steinhardt. 
MR. STEINHARDT: In Reno v. ACLU,121 the Supreme Court 
essentially said that the Communications Decency Act was over-
broad, that it attempted to regulate speech or the access of adults to 
speech in the name of protecting children, and that it inevitably 
 
120. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
121. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
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would have that result.122  The Court did not say that the statute 
was unconstitutionally vague, but it came very, very close.  Justice 
Stevens, in his majority opinion, said that “the vagueness of the 
language of indecency and patent offensiveness” contributed to the 
overbreadth of the statute.123 
The most interesting thing in light of recent developments was 
that the Court did not decide this case on the grounds that there 
were less-restrictive alternatives.124  There had been much testi-
mony at the trial before the special three-court panel in Philadel-
phia about less-restrictive alternatives, about various kinds of 
software filtering content locking-and-rating tools, but neither the 
lower court nor the Supreme Court saw the case as turning on that 
point.  That is an especially important factor as we look at what has 
occurred within three weeks of this landmark decision, a sweeping 
decision. 
We had the first White House summit on what some have 
come to call censorware.  That summit involved discussion of an 
undifferentiated, non-critically examined set of tools for rating, 
 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 2344 (“The vagueness of the [Communications Decency Act] is a matter 
of special concern . . . .”). 
124. In striking down the indecency provisions of the Communications Decency 
Act, the Supreme Court reapplied the categorical First Amendment analysis that appeared 
to have been abandoned in Denver Area Educational TV Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727 (1996), a fractured opinion that undermined the applicability of settled First 
Amendment tests.  See ACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).  In Reno, the Court found 
that the Internet bears none of the characteristics that subject other media, such as broad-
casting, to lesser First Amendment protection.  Id. at 2343-44 (“[O]ur cases provide no 
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the 
Internet].”).  The Court found that the Internet does not suffer from the same spectrum 
scarcity as broadcasting.  Id.  (noting that the Internet has virtually unlimited potential for 
growth) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (setting forth the spec-
trum scarcity rationale for broadcast regulation)).  The Reno Court found that Internet is 
“not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television” or as accessible to children.  Id. at 2343 (citing 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (setting forth the invasiveness rationale for 
broadcast regulation)).  Moreover, the Court found that Internet communications do not 
invade the home or appear on the computer screen “unbidden,” as do television images, 
and Internet users, unlike radio listeners and television viewers, are unlikely to encounter 
indecent content by accident because “almost all sexually explicit images [on the Inter-
net] are preceded by warnings as to the content.”  Id. at 2343.  Accordingly, the Court 
subjected the Communications Decency Act to strict scrutiny, rather than the lower levels 
of scrutiny reserved for regulation of other media. 
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blocking, and filtering the Internet.  A second summit occurred a 
few weeks ago and the White House participated again, although 
the summit was held in a hotel rather than facing the Rose Garden. 
There has been a very shocking development.  Although the 
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the analogy to broadcast, we 
have had a series of proposals that treat the Internet as if it were 
television or radio.  Those proposals suggest regulations on content 
on the Internet that, under American theories of free speech, most 
people would never conceive of making in regard to the print.  For 
example, some proposals advocate a labeling system or a series of 
self and third party rating systems. 
The quizzical thing, from my perspective, is that no one would 
ever suggest that all of the publishers in the print world, namely, 
newspaper publishers, magazine publishers, book publishers, writ-
ers, and editors, get together and come up with a system for rating 
content.  Here, you have the Supreme Court saying, on the one 
hand, that this medium is entitled to at least as much protection as 
the print world and is not analogous to broadcast.  Nonetheless, 
three weeks later, we begin to discuss rating systems.  In fact, the 
President has referred to the possibility of a V-chip for the Inter-
net.125 
Similarly, there have been proposals that search engines— 
which serve a function similar to the Index to Periodicals for the 
print world—adopt those rating systems and block out, that is, re-
fuse to report on, the existence of either unrated or badly rated 
cites.126  No one would ever suggest that for the Index of Periodi-
cals. 
Nor would anyone ever suggest for print, as has been suggested 
for the Internet, that everyone agree to rate their own content, that 
the government require the content to be rated, and that the gov-
ernment provide for punishment for punish those who mis-rate.  
No one would ever suggest that for the print world.  Certainly no 
one would ever be able to successfully establish that for the print 
world. 
 
125. See Laurie J. Flynn, Child’s Play on Web Includes Safety Net, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., July 1, 1997, at 18. 
126. See id. 
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The first judicial challenge to the application of some of these 
new filtering and blocking technologies is taking place in Virginia, 
where the Loudoun County library system has adopted for all pa-
trons, both adults and children, use of the X-Stop blocking soft-
ware.127  Although X-Stop has been marketed as a product which 
will block out pornography, bestiality, child pornography, and ex-
plicitly sexual materials, like many of the stand-alone blocking 
products that have been introduced in homes, libraries, and other 
public institutions, it in fact is a broad tool that blocks out, among 
other things, the Quaker web site, the American Association of 
University Women, and—my personal favorite—even a Mormon 
web site that cautions against masturbation.128 
Nonetheless, my biggest fear is that these matters will not sim-
ply come up in the context of libraries or other public institutions, 
but that we are moving toward a view of regulating the Internet as 
if it were a broadcast medium.  Such a view endangers free speech 
on the Internet.  This is very dangerous, especially in light of the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of the Internet as “the most par-
ticipatory medium . . . the ultimate marketplace of ideas.”129 
We see the move by private industry toward the adoption of 
rating/filtering systems that could well result in a more commer-
cialized, bland, and homogenized Internet.  Such action by private 
industry may lead to an Internet in which quirky speech and indi-
vidual home pages are either blocked from view or are rendered 
invisible by search engines, which refuse to report on their exis-
tence. 
There is a real danger that restricting the potential of the Inter-
net will rob individuals who, as was suggested earlier, do not own 
the print presses of the New York Times or the broadcast license of 
WCBS Radio in New York City, of the opportunity to use this me-
dium to reach audiences great and small.  We have to be very care-
ful about that.  My fellow panelist Parry Aftab, I am sure, will talk 
about this issue some more. 
 
127. See Amy Harmon, Library Suit Becomes Key Test of Freedom to Use the 
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at D1 (discussing background of case). 
128. See id. 
129. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351. 
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It is an extremely complex issue: the issue of Internet filter-
ing/blocking.  It is more complex than the Communications De-
cency Act, which the Supreme Court obviously found to be a fairly 
simple issue in legal terms.  But it is something that we are going 
to worry about, not only because it raises constitutional law ques-
tions when those technologies are employed by the government, 
but because it will shape the nature of the Internet itself. 
MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Steinhardt.  Mr. Peters is next. 
MR. PETERS: Because the title of this section is Restricting 
Speech on the Internet: Finding an Appropriate Regulatory 
Framework, it seems to me that there are two questions: first, 
whether there is a need for regulation, and second, whether a par-
ticular regulation is constitutional. 
In brief, there is a need for regulation on the Internet, particu-
larly in regard to obscenity and indecency.  I should add that at 
Morality in Media, our primary focus is pornography.  It is my 
opinion that regulation is needed because the home use of screen-
ing technology will not alone solve this problem. 
The home use of screening technology will not work because 
first, no screening technology blocks all offending sites,130 second, 
no screening technology is foolproof—kids can get around it,131 
third, not all parents will use it,132 fourth, not all of the parents who 
do use it will use it wisely and carefully,133 and finally, children 
can and will be able to access computers outside of the home.134 
In New York City, children can access the Internet through 
school,135 the library,136 places of employment,137 retail businesses, 
 
130. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Parents Can Take Steps To Monitor Kids Online, 
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1997, at 4. 
131. See Lance Gay, Firms Found Ways to Keep Workers from Smut Sites, STAR-
TRIB., July 6, 1997, at D4 (stating that “computer-educated children can find backdoor 
ways of getting information they want.”) 
132. See Gil Klein, Summit Debates Interact Risk to Youths, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1997, at A2. 
133. See id. 
134. See David S. Broder, Gore in His High Tech Element in California, Promotes 
Science and Environment, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at A11. 
135. See Abby Goodnough, Internet Access Puts Burden of Control on Schools, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1997, § 1, at 1. 
136. See Amy Harmon, On Office PC, Bosses Opt for All Work, No Play, N.Y. 
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a friend’s home, and, in the future, pocket computers.  Although I 
agree that pocket computers are not going to be great for viewing 
visual sex, they certainly would be excellent for chat rooms.  Now, 
I do not know how anyone can say, with a straight face, that home 
use of screening technology is the answer to protecting kids from 
pornography on the Internet. 
The second point in terms of the need for Internet regulation of 
indecency is that voluntary steps by the on-line services and Inter-
net service providers (“ISP”) will also not be sufficient.  The rea-
son for that, in my opinion, is that for the most part, the Internet 
industry has been unwilling to do everything it can do to curb por-
nography, and I do not see any reason to expect that to change. 
Interestingly, when the computer on-line services world con-
sisted of America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe, only Prodigy 
made an honest effort to protect kids against the junk.138  Prodigy 
really took strong action against all forms of pornography.139  
America Online and CompuServe did not.  I’ve got a file filled 
with articles describing instances of sexual exploitation of children 
that involved America Online.  I think I’ve got one article on Prod-
igy. 
The point being that the Internet industry has not shown a will-
ingness, to this point, to do what is needed to solve this problem 
voluntarily.  My fellow panelist Barry Steinhardt raised points that 
indicate that solving this problem voluntarily would not be easy, 
even if the Internet industry were willing to do everything possible. 
Related to this, there are thousands of ISPs already.  Even if the 
major ones were willing to come up with some kind of voluntary, 
genuine solution to this, this would not protect the thousands of 
people using the other ISPs.  It is safe to say that, given the nature 
 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A1. 
137. See id. 
138. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). 
139. See Marc Jacobson, Prodigy: It May Be Many Things to Many People, But it is 
Not a Publisher For Purposes of Libel and Other Opinions, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 673 (1996); R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Defamation in Cyberspace: A Court Takes 
a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services 
Co., 49 ARK. L. REV. 589, 593-94 (1996). 
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of the Internet community, many ISPs will not go along with any 
voluntary plan. 
So, Congress should try to draft intelligent legislation which, 
while it will not solve the whole problem by any means, will pro-
vide some protection in conjunction with the use of home screen-
ing technology and whatever else is available.  That is the position 
that I have taken from day one.  I have never felt that the law was 
the whole answer to this problem.  I also concluded long ago that 
without the law, there will be no answer to protecting children on 
the Internet. 
Now, I have some points on the impact of Reno v. ACLU.140  I 
think that it depends in part on how you read the case.  It can be 
read as validating the view that there shall be no regulation of in-
decency on the Internet; there are statements in Justice Stevens’s 
opinion that would support that view.141  Another way to look at 
the case is as striking down a particular law because of glaring de-
fects in that law.142 
Now, assuming that the second view is the correct interpreta-
tion of Reno v. ACLU,143 I will just mention briefly three problems 
with the Communications Decency Act that we recognized at Mo-
rality in Media.  I should add that although we did have some input 
in shaping the Communications Decency Act, we did not shape the 
entire piece of legislation.  For the most part, it was out of our 
hands.  But in terms of problems that we recognized, both early on 
and as time went along: 
First, it is arguable that it was Congress’s job, not the courts, to 
sort through the many technological complexities of the Internet 
and craft a piece of legislation that recognized that there are differ-
ent forms of communication on the Internet.  Some parts of the 
Internet function like broadcasting.  Other parts of the Internet are 
similar to accessing a library.144  There are all kinds of chat 
 
140. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
141. See id. at 2332-33. 
142. See id. 
143. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
144. See Glenn Kubota, Public School Usage of Internet Filtering Software: Book 
Banning Reincarnated?, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 687, 692 (1997). 
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rooms,145 which are kind of like party lines found on the telephone.  
The Internet also has news groups,146 which might count as a to-
tally different means of communication. 
I hasten to add there was an article recently in the Wall Street 
Journal, describing how news groups were regulating them-
selves,147 and another article in the New York Times about how 
chat lines were regulating themselves.148  If self-regulation is pos-
sible, so is legal regulation. 
But the point is that the Internet is a complex media, which 
presents the interesting legal question of who must sort out he 
complexities, and decide how to regulate the Internet.  Is it Con-
gress’s job or the FCC’s or the courts’? 
I think a good case could be made, given the state of technol-
ogy for the Internet, that it really was Congress’s job, not the 
courts’.  I do not think anybody would argue with the following 
statement:  Congress did not do that job.  Basically, Congress pro-
vided us with a blunderbuss statute with some specific defenses 
that admittedly would not always apply,149 and presumably thought 
that the courts were going to work out this complex thing on a 
case-by-case basis.150 
But given the fact that we were dealing with a criminal law,151 
that approach presented difficulties.  In any case, it would have 
been better had Congress worked through most of the problems in-
stead of throwing the thing in the lap of the courts. 
 
145. See Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment 
Protection For Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1591, 1593 (1997). 
146. See Jeffery M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators For Defamation Pub-
lished By Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation Into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247, 
253 (1995). 
147. See Timothy Hanrahan, The Internet:  The Moderator, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 
1997, at R26. 
148. See Laurie J. Flynn, Taking In the Sites; Web Discussion Forums Both Public 
and Private, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1997, at D6; see also Lisa Bransten, Companies Are 
Talking Up Chat Rooms.  More Firms See Them As Way To Improve Service, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 15, 1997, at B10. 
149. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e) (West 1998 
& Supp. 1998). 
150. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2339, 2345 (1997). 
151. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 223(a), 223(d). 
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Part of my explanation for why Congress enacted such legisla-
tion is that there are some members of Congress who do not like 
the FCC.  Congress should have handed the job of devising me-
dium-specific regulations to the FCC.  My suspicion, however, is 
that even that would not have worked.  But a lot more progress 
would have been made in terms of coming up with an intelligent 
law. 
A second problem with the Communications Decency Act was 
that neither the FCC nor the lower courts had adequately clarified 
the indecency definition.152  Certainly, wealthy radio stations have 
been fined by the FCC for indecency violations, but because the 
fines were relatively small, the stations paid them and did not raise 
any legal challenges.153 
And so, basically speaking, while we do have FCC rulings that 
address indecency, there is not much real law.  In particular, the 
courts have seldom examined the application of the indecency 
standard and tried to set some limits or clarify some things.  That 
was never done. 
The Supreme Court was justified in recognizing that it is not 
wise to expect little Joe Citizen to have the same knowledge of the 
law as the FCC.154  I guess, in hoping that the Court would uphold 
this law, Congress hoped the Court would do a better job clarifying 
the indecency standard than the FCC.  But the Court declined to do 
so.  I found it very interesting, however, that while the Supreme 
Court was unwilling to flesh out the indecency standard, the Court 
was willing to clarify the concept of sexual harassment by provid-
ing guidelines,155 which were both criticized156 and recognized as a 
step in the right direction.157 
 
152. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345. 
153. See Chris McConnell, FCC Indecency Review Yields Few Fines, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 27, 1997, at 26. 
154. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329 (discussing reasons for invalidating portions of 
the Communications Decency Act on vagueness grounds). 
155. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
156. See Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court’s Standard Response: Creating an 
Effective Test for Determining Hostile Work Environment Harassment Under Title VII, 
24 STETSON L. REV. 719 (1995). 
157. See Susan Collins, Note, Harris v. Forklift Systems:  A Modest Clarification of 
the Inquiry in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1515 
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Now, whether or not they were justified at this point in time in 
refusing that invitation is a question that I can not answer.  At any 
rate, in a court case arising in the television medium a couple of 
years ago, the FCC was supposed to clarify the indecency standard 
and they did not.158 
I just happened to read in Broadcasting & Cable magazine that 
the new FCC Commissioner considers that task a priority.159  I 
hope that the FCC does a wise job in clarifying the indecency stan-
dard. 
My point is that we recognized problems in the current inde-
cency standard.  Arguably, the Supreme Court could have provided 
the clarity that was lacking.  But in its defense, the Court did not 
have much to work with.  There was not a good, sound body of law 
available to consult.  In large part, they would have had to craft the 
standard on their own.  So, perhaps wisely, they chose not to do it. 
The third problem with the Communications Decency Act con-
cerns the choice between two standards:  harmful-to-minors160 ver-
sus indecency.161  We fought for the indecency standard, but only 
because we felt there were also problems with non-consenting 
adults being exposed to indecency on the Internet.  It has always 
been our position that the indecency standard is an indecent-for-all 
standard that is intended for what, in effect, is a mixed audience of 
adults and children. 
If you look at the origins of the indecency concept, I think it is 
an honest statement to say that the main purpose of it was not to 
protect children.162  It was a public morality and public sensibilities 
concern.  Thus, in proceedings involving broadcast indecency, the 
FCC unilaterally decided that non-consenting adults, in the privacy 
 
(1994). 
158. See Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75 (1996). 
159. See Chris McConnell, Channel Surfing with New FCC: Democratic Majority 
May Be More Willing To Regulate Content, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 24, 1997, at 
26. 
160. See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1968). 
161. See The Communications Decency Act: A Cyber-Gag to First Amendment 
Rights on the Internet, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 187, 205-09 (1997). 
162. See Alec Harrell, Note, Who Cares About Prior Restraint?  An Analysis of the 
FCC’s Enforcement of Indecency Forfeiture Orders, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 239, 240-41 
(1996). 
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of their home, should not be protected against indecency.  The only 
valid government concern that the FCC was willing to recognize 
was the concern for children. 
That was the decision the FCC made, despite the fact that, in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,163 the Supreme Court had specifi-
cally, both in the plurality opinion and concurring opinion, recog-
nized the valid interest of protecting adults in the privacy of the 
home from indecency.164  But in our opinion, if the only concern 
was protecting children, particularly where pornography is con-
cerned, clearly the obscene for minors standard was the one most 
appropriate. 
In terms of what is next, clearly the answer depends on what is 
the correct interpretation of the Court’s decision.  Part of it also 
depends on what action, if any, is taken by Congress. 
Many accused Congress of using the Communications De-
cency Act for political purposes.165  I think there is some truth to 
that.  Congress wanted to be on record in an election year as doing 
something about pornography on the Internet.  It will now be inter-
esting to see how committed Congress really is in protecting chil-
dren. 
A related issue is whether Congress will be able to swallow its 
pride and authorize the FCC to address the specifics of the Internet 
with specific regulations tailored to the specific problems, in con-
trast to Congress throwing out another general piece of legislation.  
If Congress does decide to try again, I suggest that it gets the FCC 
involved because the FCC is suited to address this problem.  I 
would also say that it is pretty clear from Reno v. ACLU that 
someone must examine each form of Internet communication, the 
problems that may arise in particular forms of communication, and 
draft a proposed law or regulations aimed at particular problems.166  
Obviously, there will be some questions that have to be answered 
in specific cases.  That is the job of the Supreme Court and the 
 
163. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
164. Id. at 731 n.2; see also id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
165. See Patrick A. Trueman, Porn on the Internet, Here and Abroad, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at A19. 
166. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2331-33 (1997). 
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lower courts. 
My last recommendation is that Congress avoid repeating the 
mistake of letting the on-line services and ISPs off the hook.  In 
my opinion, the Internet content providers can do a lot more than 
the lower courts167 and the Supreme Court168 found that they can 
do.  I previously mentioned articles in the Wall Street Journal and 
the New York Times about how different news groups and chat 
rooms are self-regulating.169  Industry monitoring is possible, de-
spite the findings of the district courts.170  Even the Supreme Court 
has recognized the industry’s potential role.171 
But I do recognize that there will be no effective regulation if 
the whole onus is put on the content providers.  In some cases, the 
only entity in the Internet that may be able to effectively block 
children's access is the Internet access provider.  In my opinion, 
because those folks give Congress a lot of money, they got off the 
hook. 
It is safe to say that efforts toward protecting children from in-
decency on the Internet will not succeed unless Congress holds on-
line services and ISPs responsible for what they can realistically 
do.  We were involved in the crafting of the Communications De-
cency Act, and I will tell you nobody was trying to put an obliga-
tion on anybody that would be, practically speaking, impossible.  
But clearly the Internet access providers can do something other 
than provide parents with the option of adding home screening 
technology. 
If Congress lets them off the hook again, only kids with re-
sponsible parents who manage to inculcate their children with the 
necessary moral values will be protected on the Internet; and, just 
 
167. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that Internet 
content providers cannot prevent material from reaching users once such material is 
posted on the web). 
168. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
169. See Weber, supra note 147. 
170. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 863 (explaining that treating Internet content provid-
ers as publishers would expose them to liabilities against which they could not protect 
due to the difficulty of removing posted messages or preventing obscene material from 
reaching users once posted on the web). 
171. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337 (recognizing that credit card verification systems 
can determine the age of the user). 
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plainly speaking, the rest of them be damned. 
MR. SIMS: Thank you, Robert Peters.  Our final speaker to set 
the stage for our open discussion is Ms. Aftab. 
MS. AFTAB: I am going to take a different tack.  Because you 
now understand everything you need to know about restricting 
speech in cyberspace, let me tell you a little bit about Fordham 
Law School. 
Last year I sat on this panel.172  It was just before the Commu-
nications Decency Act oral argument.  I was thrilled to have been 
asked to speak.  At that time, I ran a whole bunch of on-line legal 
discussions for lawyers, I was host of the Court TV Law Center’s 
legal help line and America Online’s (“AOL”) legal discussions, 
and all these other things, which just means that I talked a lot on-
line; it did not mean that I was necessarily an expert on free 
speech. 
So I was invited and I learned an incredible amount at this 
panel because both the chief lawyer arguing the case for the 
ACLU173 and the chief lawyer arguing for the government174 were 
panelists.  The brief of the ACLU175 was going in the next morning 
and we were trying to find out what it was going to say.  We were 
all very excited about this.  I learned about the Communications 
Decency Act at that panel discussion. 
A week later, I got a phone call from CNN.  They asked me if I 
would cover the Communications Decency Act oral argument for 
them and talk about child-filtering software.  I am a mother; I am 
forty-six years old; my kids are in college; what do I know about 
child-filtering software?  I had no idea what they were talking 
about. 
But I consulted last year’s second issue of the Fordham Intel-
lectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal, and I 
went to the underlying decision.  Sure enough, the opinion talked 
 
172. See Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law: Inde-
cency on the Internet: Constitutionality of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 463 (1997). 
173. See id.  Christopher A. Hansen was chief counsel for the ACLU. 
174. See id.  Theodore C. Hirt was the chief lawyer for the United States. 
175. See Brief for Appellees, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511). 
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about child-filtering software. 
So I did the piece for CNN.  We talked about free speech on 
the Internet and I recited everything I had learned at the panel and 
everything I had learned about children’s Internet safety and filter-
ing software.176  I got more phone calls, e-mail, and letters from 
parents after that one appearance on CNN than I had ever gotten 
from any other appearances on CNN or anywhere else.  They 
wrote, “This is great.  How safe are my kids?  I understand this ar-
gument and I appreciate free speech, but I’ve got kids and I don’t 
know what to do with them, and I don’t even know how to turn on 
a computer much less protect them in cyberspace.” 
So I called my sister, who is a pediatrician for AOL on Prime 
and for Parent Time, and I said, “Find a book that somebody has 
written and give me the title so that every time somebody sends me 
one of these e-mails, I’ll tell them to go buy the book.”  She could 
not find one, but she is a doctor, and doctors do not read, so I 
called up my friends trying to find one.  No one could find one.  
Then we figured out that there really was not a book out there to 
teach parents the basics in an efficient way. 
So I decided to start an outline for such a book.  In fact, we 
wrote the first definitive book that really covers all the topics.177  
Now I understand a lot more about filtering software.  Let me tell 
you what I have learned over the last year. 
I have learned that the statements I made on CNN and the 
statements that Robert Peters just made here, about how children 
can get around this stuff, is not as true as I thought it was when I 
first spoke on television.  I located young hackers and promised 
them $100 for every one of the four software programs that we 
tested: CyberPatrol, Net Nanny, CyberSitter, and Surf Watch.  I 
said, “This is the software.  Get around it.  I’ll pay you $100, and 
you’ll tell me how you did it.” 
In typical big mouth manner, I contacted the software compa-
nies and told them that child hackers could easily hack their filter-
ing programs.  They all panicked and wanted to know how the 
 
176. See CNN TODAY:  Products Offered to Parents to Screen Internet (CNN tele-
vision broadcast, Mar. 19, 1997). 
177. See AFTAB, supra note 3. 
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child hackers had done it.  So I sent an e-mail to Chris, who was 
my child hacker, asking, “Hey, Chris, how did you break it?”  He 
said, “Oh, I couldn’t break it.”  So we had to change the text of the 
book.  But I learned that it is not so easy to get around those pro-
grams. 
I also learned that parents are not sure that they want to use 
those programs.  Parents want to keep their children safe, but a lot 
of them want to know how to keep their children safe on their own. 
I have spoken with various members of the United States Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives about Internet legislation and 
children Internet safety and filtering on-line.  Every single one of 
them who has asked me to talk with them has asked me questions 
about filtering software and I have answered them.  At the end, 
they typically remark how terrible the problem is and that the solu-
tion is to get children off the Internet.  But I think that view is part 
of the problem, not the solution. 
I started out as a free-speech advocate.  Although I started writ-
ing the book very free-speech oriented, I recognized that parents 
have a legitimate concern.  There has to be a way to give parents a 
handle on keeping their children safe without encroaching on the 
constitutional rights of other people.  Indecency is constitutionally 
permitted for adults.178  I did not want to rewrite the indecency 
standard, but I did want to rewrite the obscenity standard in this 
country. 
I also have a lot of problems with the fact that obscenity stan-
dards were being based on where the material was read.  For ex-
ample, because material that was put on the Internet in California 
was read in Tennessee, it was judged under Tennessee stan-
dards.179 
So I see a lot of those problems and as I got more involved and 
became one of the experts, reluctantly, of filtering software, I have 
learned that we really need structure. 
Although I used to think that the filtering software was going 
to be the answer, I no longer think so.  I really think that educating 
 
178. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
179. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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parents is the answer.  I do not think it is regulation. 
I have seen the new “Son of CDA”180 that Senator Coats has 
put out and, after discussing it with other cyberspace lawyers who 
think that it actually may pass constitutional challenge, a lot of us 
are uncomfortable with it.  I do not like any regulations on the 
Internet because I see the beauty of the evolution of the Internet on 
an international basis. 
There has been an evolution from last year, when I sat here in 
this room, to my involvement at the summit.  I was brought in to 
help prepare most of the White Paper for the Child Advocacy Task 
Force because I was seen as a moderate.  The religious right 
groups and some of the more protective groups recognized that 
they needed a broader base of people to support what they were 
doing, and I was brought in for that reason. 
It was the first time I really had an open dialogue with a lot of 
groups.  I have met a lot of groups who are actually doing things to 
try to clean up the parts of cyberspace that most of us agree should 
be cleaned up. 
I met a group called Cyber Angels,181 which until then I was 
not particularly thrilled about.  I had read about them.  They are af-
filiated with the Guardian Angels.  But they actually find sites of 
child pornography and child abuse on-line and they try to shut 
them down.  They will patrol chat rooms.  They have 60,000 
members worldwide patrolling chat rooms and trying to keep peo-
ple from preying on others. 
Regardless of your opinion, that kind of thing can be done.  I 
think that there is a strong base of people trying to do something, 
which is fine because something must be done. 
I think the answer might be a combination.  When my children 
were growing up, I let them eat peanut butter and jelly, pizza, and 
Spaghetti-O’s, and the only rule I had—against Welch’s grape 
 
180. Internet Material Harmful to Minors Amendment, S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(amending Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit distribution on the web of material 
harmful to minors). 
181. See generally Rachel Sylvester, Vigilantes Keep Cyberspace Safe from Crimi-
nals, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 5, 1995, at 21 (discussing vigilante groups in 
cyberspace). 
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juice—was to protect my carpet from stains I couldn’t get out.  But 
my younger sister has her children eating bananas and peanut but-
ter, not on Wonder Bread but on celery, makes all of their bread 
and cookies homemade, and does not allow them to eat at McDon-
ald’s at all.  It is not up to me to tell her how to parent her children 
and it is not up to her to tell me how to parent mine.  I wrote the 
book Parent’s Guide to the Internet: How to Protect Your Kids in 
Cyberspace182 to teach parents what they need to know to make 
their own choices and then to implement and enforce those 
choices. 
So I think that while we may be talking about laws that should 
be enacted or laws that should not be enacted, or whether PICS183 
is appropriate, or whether filtering software over-filters, I think we 
also need to keep in mind that we need practical solutions for peo-
ple who want to know now what they can do to protect their chil-
dren when they go on-line.  For instance, some parents might think 
that they know how to be perfectly safe with their children, then 
they sit down next to a computer and the child asks to see the 
NASA site.  The mother or father says, “Sure,” and types in 
“nasa.com.”  Because that parent skipped over that part of the book 
where I explain that the “.com” means that it is a commercial site 
and not a government site, the parent types in “nasa.com” and 
finds a billboard site for six pornographic sites.  It takes them right 
to it. 
I found that site, which came out in CNN and in a couple of 
other places,184 before they started covering up the pictures.  A lot 
of unwilling viewers saw that site’s graphic images.  And a lot of 
young children who were looking for Pathfinder found themselves 
learning more about biology than space. 
We need to put a lot more time and attention into educating 
people and giving them choices.  The choices may include using 
 
182. See AFTAB, supra note 3. 
183. See generally Bruce Handy, Why Johnny Can’t Surf: How to Protect Kids from 
Online Smut?, TIME, Dec. 15, 1997, at 75 (describing the controversy surrounding the 
Platform for Internet Content Selection, a world wide web consortium specification for 
labeling Internet content). 
184. See Lawrence Magid, Cyberculture Sex Cites Capitalizing on Misleading 
URLs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at D3. 
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software at your desktop to keep your children out of trouble; it 
may include finding an on-line service provider or an ISP that has 
server-level blocking; it may include educating your children to be 
able to determine and value whatever they see, no matter what it is, 
so if it is the kind of thing you do not want them to see, they will 
click off of it; and it may be something in between. 
But I think, as aspiring and practicing lawyers, we need to rec-
ognize that there is no one answer to this.  The longer I am in-
volved with it, the more I recognize that I do not have the answers.  
So I want you to keep your eyes, your ears, and your opinions open 
on this one, because my opinion has changed and I find myself in 
the middle of the road. 
You need to recognize that we have to address people’s con-
cerns, and those concerns may be the same or different in other 
countries.  You have got to keep your eyes open and your earns 
open and your brain functioning, so that the remedy fashioned will 
work for everybody who wants that selection choice. 
Good luck, it is going to be your job. 
MR. SIMS: Thank you, Ms. Aftab.  I would like to thank all of 
our fine panelists for their excellent presentations. 
Our format from here will be a roundtable discussion followed 
by questions from the audience.  I had some questions, but, 
frankly, like the fisherman in the movie Jaws, I have a sense there 
is already a lot of chum in the water here.  So, first, would any of 
you like to respond to anything that anyone else has said? 
MR. PETERS: If Parry Aftab is correct, you will not have any 
worry because there will not be any law to uphold or defend. 
MS. AFTAB: That’s interesting. 
MR. PETERS: She cannot talk to you like a young lawyer. 
MS. AFTAB: I think that there will be law, I think there are 
laws, and I think the laws that we have now will be applied in cy-
berspace in the way the Supreme Court has told us:185  that cyber-
space is a library and it will be treated like print media.186  Print 
 
185. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
186. See id. at 2347-2348. 
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media has laws that govern what you can do.  I think that the laws 
that exist now, if we are smart about how we apply them and open-
minded about the technology, with a little bit of twisting and turn-
ing, work well.  I do not know that I want Congress fiddling 
around with something they do not yet understand. 
MR. KURNIT: I would like to add to that.  I am not sure that 
the laws work as well as they should.  People say things are imper-
fect.  Well, when it comes to the First Amendment, it means we err 
on the side of keeping the government out.  We have laws dealing 
with child pornography187 and pandering,188 and there is the ob-
scenity standard.189  Before we think about making more laws, 
there is a police department in Oklahoma that went out and seized 
copies of The Tin Drum from people’s homes.190  Fortunately for 
all of us, one of the people who had rented The Tin Drum from the 
 
187. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.125 (Michie 
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (Deering 
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3a-196 (1997); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-100 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/11-16 (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A 
(1997); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A-C (Law. Co-op. 1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 
28.710 (Law. Co-op. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 
573.025 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463 
(Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649 
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-30-1 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6A-1 (Michie 
1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00 (Consol. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323 
(Anderson 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1 (1997); 
S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-23.1 
(Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43-26 
(West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-374.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9.68A.40 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-302 (Mi-
chie 1997). 
188. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3209 (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 
1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266 (Deering 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-203 (1997); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2705 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-12 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/11-16 (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.84 (Michie 
§ 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 426 (1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.710 (Law. Co-op. 
1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-802 (Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.300 
(Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (Anderson 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
34-1-3 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 1625-26 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. § 944.33 (1996). 
189. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (delineating test to determine 
whether material is obscene). 
190. See Police Seizure of Film ‘Tin Drum’ Illegal, Judge Rules, COM. APPEAL, 
Dec. 28, 1997, at A5. 
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local video store was the head of the ACLU.191  But we have 
judges who do not understand that Garrison v. Maryland192 says 
that police cannot just go and seize without some judicial determi-
nation first.193 
Stratton Oakmont,194 when we got involved, had already turned 
into a debacle because neither the judge nor the lawyers in the case 
were aware that you can not generally enjoin a libel.  Thus the 
whole decision—which went awry until the Communications De-
cency Act—was based on trying to enforce an injunction against 
future libel, which should never have come down at all. 
So I think as lawyers, we should think about whether or not we 
support a new Communications Decency Act or additional regula-
tion when we hear that such legislation can not be perfect.  It is go-
ing to be problematic.  We come back to the question of whether or 
not our Congress is competent to regulate a technology that it does 
not understand when that technology will change before Congress 
can get a bill through the process. 
I do not think that there is a hole that needs to be filled.  I think 
that there is enough law.  But, to the extent that there is a hole, if 
we tried to fill it, most likely the technology would get around it 
before the law could take effect or the law would be ineffective on 
its face.  In this realm, any effort at imposing some new regulation 
will only lead to bigger problems. 
MS. AFTAB: So we agree that there is a problem there now? 
MR. KURNIT: Yes. 
MS. AFTAB: Okay. 
MR. SIMS: Ms. Fantino? 
MS. FANTINO: I agree with Rick Kurnit.  I think that there are 
already enough statutes on the books, including the Sexual Exploi-
tation of Children Act,195 which allows criminal penalties against 
 
191. See id.  Michael Cornfield, the development director for the Oklahoma ACLU, 
brought the action.  See id. 
192. Garrison v. State of Maryland, 303 Md. 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
193. See id. at 391-392. 
194. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). 
195. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
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those purveyors of child pornography.196  As for Morality in Media 
worrying about adults, well, if you come upon a page you do not 
like, you turn the page. 
I just want to point out what a hot issue this is as the lawmakers 
were very uncomfortable legislating in this area.  I do not know if 
you are aware of the real power of the media, but as a reporter for 
CBS, it is easy for me to contact whomever I want.  Every member 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee whom I called returned my call.  
Once they realized the subject on which I wanted a quote, they 
clammed up.  They would not comment on cyber-legislation, pe-
riod.  They are ready to talk about everything else, but when it 
comes to articulating their opinion on this, they clam up. 
MR. PETERS: One gap that I think Justice Stevens seemed to 
have recognized was the difference between obscene for adults and 
obscene for minors.197  In the real world, which we can touch at 
least with our hands, there are laws that prohibit hard-core adult 
obscenity for everybody.198  Courts and legislative bodies recog-
nized decades ago that while we might want to protect certain 
types of sex material for adults, they are not good for kids.  So 
there are two types of laws:  one type prohibiting the sale of adult 
obscenity to you and me,199 and another type prohibiting the sale to 
 
196. Id. § 2251(d). 
197. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997). 
198. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.125 (Michie 
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3 (Deering 
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3a-196 (1997); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-100 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/11-16 (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A 
(1997); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A-C (Law. Co-op. 1997); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 
28.710 (Law. Co-op. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 
573.025 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463 
(Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649 
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-30-1 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6A-1 (Michie 
1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00 (Consol. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323 
(Anderson 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1 (1997); 
S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-23.1 
(Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43-26 
(West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-374.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9.68A.40 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-302 (Mi-
chie 1997). 
199. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-191 91997); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-20-80 (1997); 
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minors of material obscene for minors,200 which is a broader stan-
dard intended to protect children. 
No such law exists on the Internet at this point, certainly at the 
federal level.  So basically what we say on the Internet is that 
whatever is protected speech for adults, in terms of pornographic 
materials on the Internet, at this moment in time is also legal for 
children.  Now, perhaps none of you believe that is a gap.  I think it 
is a gap. 
If you read the Reno decision, the Court referred to the “harm-
ful to minors” law as perhaps being the answer201—at least part of 
the answer. 
MR. SIMS: Thank you.  Any other comments? 
MR. STEINHARDT: First, I am not so sure that Bob Peters 
and I read the same decision, we will have to spend some time 
later-on comparing notes. 
We have had a lot of discussion today, and there is going to be 
a lot of discussion in the future, about whether or not these statutes 
can be effective.  In the ultimate, they cannot be effective.  We are 
discussing a global medium, which perceives censorship as dam-
age and routes around it.202  In the end, it is going to be very diffi-
cult to have any law, whether it is a national law in this country or 
any other country, which will successfully control all the content 
of the Internet. 
That, however, is going to be very cold comfort to those who 
become the victims of these laws in this country or any other coun-
try, as I was reminded, for example, today when panelist Lisa Fan-
tino mentioned the Chinese government’s attitude toward the 
 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (1997); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-190.1 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1 (Michie 1997). 
200. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.130 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1 
(Deering 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-3 (Michie 1997); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, 
§ 28 (Law. Co-op. 1998); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 45-8-2061 (Law. Co-op. 1997); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (Anderson 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-345 (Law. Co-op. 
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24-28 (Michie 1997). 
201. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997). 
202. See S.E. Goodman & L.T. Greenberg, Is Big Brother Hanging by His Boot-
straps, COMM. ASS’N COMPUTING MACH., July 1, 1996, at 11, available in WESTLAW, 
1996 WL 9011859. 
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Internet.  The Chinese government greatly restricts access to the 
Internet.203  It is in the process of building the world’s largest 
Intranet, where everything will be filtered through government 
proxies.204  In the end, I do not believe the Chinese government 
will be successful.  I think they have opened a Pandora’s box.  But 
that is going to be very cold comfort to a dissident sitting in a Chi-
nese jail cell or in a labor camp who was imprisoned for accessing 
Western thought over the Internet.  That is happening. 
So it is important to remember as we debate whether these laws 
can be effective that, even if a war cannot be won, it does not mean 
there will not be innocent victims.  The Communications Decency 
Act was an example of that.  It was a war on indecency on the 
Internet that Congress could not win, but the clients represented by 
the ACLU, along with the First Amendment, avoided becoming 
innocent victims and prevailed. 
MR. SIMS: Thank you.  Any other questions or comments?  
Just to pick up, I have a couple of quick questions myself.  Robert 
Peters, as I understand your point, you were talking about Con-
gress, perhaps via the FCC, holding the Internet access providers 
liable for failing to do what they could realistically do, as a techno-
logical matter, to screen out obscenity and indecency.  But as I un-
derstand Richard Kurnit’s point, by the time Congress could define 
the obligations of the Internet providers, technological advances 
would likely have outstripped the legislation, enabling the users to 
circumvent the access provider’s screening technology, rendering 
the latter obsolete and the providers legally vulnerable under anti-
quated legislation and regulations.  How do you respond to that? 
MR. PETERS: I guess one common-sense response would be 
that if the Internet access providers can provide parents with the 
option to add screening technology, the process could be reversed.  
I recognize the problem of the screening technology blocking too 
much, but let’s just assume that screening technology could suc-
cessfully block the sites that virtually everyone agrees are not suit-
 
203. See Donald Conant, et al., Collection of Articles by Carl Middlehurst of Sun 
Microsystems, Inc., 471 PLI/PAT. 549, 564 (1997); Amy Knoll, Any Which Way But 
Lose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 275, 296 (1996). 
204. See Mark LaPedus, China Intranet To Connect 50 Cities, ELECTRONIC BUYERS 
NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997. 
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able for access by children. 
I think it would be technologically possible to simply reverse 
the process and instead require adults to provide identification be-
fore they can gain access to pornographic sites.  Part of the Su-
preme Court’s concern with the Communications Decency Act was 
the Internet content providers’ difficulty in verifying identification, 
which is a legitimate concern. 
But clearly, the Internet access providers can check identifica-
tion.  In some cases, they may be the only entity on the Internet 
that realistically could provide some meaningful protection for 
children by effectively screening for age. 
Again, I do not see legislation as the whole answer to this.  It 
requires a combination of technological limits and First Amend-
ment limits.  But screening technology is also not the whole an-
swer.  I sat with some students at lunch today and one of them said 
his mother taught pre-school and that she was teaching her students 
how to use the Internet.  Now, to assume that every parent of each 
one of those children is going to become knowledgeable about the 
Internet and the use of the screening technology is impractical.  I 
have read in the New York Times205 and other places206 that most 
people agree that screening technology is not the whole answer. 
How can we possibly assume that every child in the United 
States has a parent that will provide the necessary oversight?  So I 
think the law must plug some of the holes; that is how I see the 
law.  It can plug some of the holes.  If I were in Congress, I would 
try to do that, win or lose. 
MR. KURNIT: One comment on that.  There are ISPs that do 
provide that kind of service.  One told me about their structure 
back when it was much more proprietary and less on the Internet.  
They made it clear to their subscribers that the A subscriber could 
have as many as six sub-subscribers, and the A subscriber could 
 
205. Peter H. Lewis, An On-Line Service Halts Restriction on Sex Material, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at A1. 
206. See John W. Kennedy, Profamily Groups Demand More Cyberporn Prosecu-
tions; Protecting Children From Pornography on the Internet, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, 
Feb. 9, 1998; Michael A. Banks, Filtering the Net in Libraries: The Case, COMPUTERS IN 
LIBRARIES, Mar. 1, 1998, at 50. 
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provide that some of those sub-subscribers would not have Internet 
access, but only the proprietary software.  This was pretty much 
ineffective, however, because they found that, in most households, 
the A subscriber was a twelve-year-old child who helped his or her 
mother and father gain access to the Internet. 
MR. PETERS: Part of my answer to that is, if you have a par-
ent in the home that really understands the Internet, that parent is 
the best protection that child has.  In many homes, where children 
don’t have that Internet-savvy parent, those children are going to 
need some help from some other sources. 
Let’s assume that the law required all ISPs to block access to 
known pornographic sites unless the subscriber provided adequate 
identification.  To me, that would be adequate protection for a lot 
of children.  It would protect them in many schools.  Not all the 
schools use screening technology.  There is a belief that they do, 
but they do not.  But even in New York City, I assume teachers 
would not sign up to give their six-year-olds access to hard-core 
porn sites.  So if that block automatically existed, a lot of children 
would receive a form of protection that they do not get under the 
current state of affairs. 
MS. AFTAB: Even in New York.  I think, however, that if 
there is the kind of interest that you are talking about, it would be 
very easy for somebody to set up an ISP that says: “You cannot get 
access.  We are going to apply filtering across-the-board and you 
cannot have access to any of these other things.”  And then, if there 
is enough of a market need for that, a lot of people will sign up for 
that.  But that is choice, not law. 
CyberPatrol207 is a technology used by all of the on-line service 
providers.  AOL uses this technology, and CompuServe and Prod-
igy use the product.208  There are different ways of setting it.  AOL 
is also one that will allow you to ban access to chat rooms, and 
other on-line places, for your kids.209  Most of the other on-line 
 
207. CyberPatrol 4.0 is manufactured by Microsystems Software.  Information 
about this technology is available at www.cyberpatrol.com.  See Richard J. Dalton Jr., A 
Safer Web for Kids, NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1997, at F10. 
208. See id. 
209. See Carol Ellison, How to Use AOL’s Parental Controls, HOME PC, Oct. 1, 
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service providers do that as well.210 
There are a lot of relatively simple ways to get there.  I, as an 
adult, as a person who lives in the United States, and as a person 
who has access to anything I want to see that is legal in this coun-
try, do not want to have to sign up with my name and my identifi-
cation number to see what is perfectly legal for me to see.  Know-
ing how data is collected on the Internet and knowing the problems 
we have with privacy on the Internet, I have major concerns with 
that. 
I have a real problem with the fact that I might get better pro-
tection renting a videotape under the current law211 than I might 
have under those circumstances.  As an adult, I should not have to 
sign up, qualify, and prove a lot of things to people who may be 
able to take information from me on-line. 
It is much easier to restrict the children.  As an adult, I do not 
want my children pre-selected to have certain information.  I want 
my children to be able to measure things knowledgeably, and I 
want to be able to educate my children so they know that certain 
things are unacceptable.  Whether it is in a movie or in a book or 
on the Internet, I want to teach my children that there are certain 
things that they should turn off when they see, as opposed to my 
pre-screening a lot of things for them.  But that is my choice as a 
parent.  I just do not want anyone else making those choices for 
me. 
MR. PETERS: If I could respond to that, to my knowledge, 
Internet access is not free.  If you are paying for Internet access, 
the ISP already has personal information about you.  So in terms of 
finding out how old you are, it is a minor thing if they already have 
your credit card numbers and other information. 
MS. AFTAB: But not at that site. 
 
1997, at 175. 
210. For example, America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe all provide control 
features that allow users to block access to chat rooms.  See Nancy Tamosaitis, Parental 
Discretion Advised; Steer Clear of Cyberspace’s Steamier Side, COMPUTER LIFE, Nov. 1, 
1994, at 163. 
211. In New York, for example, personal privacy and personal information are pro-
tected by statute.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 671 (McKinney 1997). 
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MR. PETERS: No, no, no.  I am talking about the age screen-
ing process taking place when you sign up for access to the Inter-
net.  It does not always have to occur at a chat room or newsgroup 
or Web site.  There could be privacy protections in the law to en-
sure that ISPs will not give out this information. 
I am just saying that, relatively speaking, that intrusion for you, 
the customer, is a very small one because you already signed your 
life over to them when you signed up for the service. 
MS. AFTAB: I think it is a big intrusion.  But, then again, I 
understand Internet technology. 
MR. STEINHARDT: I think you really have to spend more 
time on-line.  You need to get a sense of the breadth of the Inter-
net.  You have this notion of the Internet as television, where 
maybe there are 120 channels.  There are millions of web sites,212 
and that does not even begin to deal with news groups, chat rooms, 
e-mail, and all the other forms of communication on the Internet.  
And I can tell you from representing people who have been thrown 
out of America Online that America Online is pretty aggressive in 
monitoring chat rooms.213 
MS. AFTAB: I was thrown off. 
MR. STEINHARDT: If you could be thrown off, anybody 
could be thrown off.  I have never actually been thrown off.  I 
guess I’m embarrassed by that. 
MS. AFTAB: You have to know what you need to do. 
MR. STEINHARDT: That’s right.  I do know. 
The notion that an Internet service provider is going to be in a 
position to effectively pick and choose those sites which are ap-
propriate for children is really fanciful.  When America Online, for 
example, tried to filter on the basis of certain key words, one of the 
words they filtered out was the word “breast.”214  What happened?  
 
212. The number of World Wide Web sites is estimated between two and four mil-
lion, with the number continuously growing.  See Greg Mazurkiewicz, Nothing But Net: 
Useful Internet Sites, Air Conditioning, HEATING & REFRIGERATION NEWS, Sept. 29, 
1997, at 6; The Web of Information Inequality, LANCET, June 21, 1997, at 1781. 
213. See Michael Beebe, AOL Draws Line on Fighting Child Pornography, BUFF. 
NEWS, Oct. 1, 1997, at A15. 
214. See, Ari Staiman, Note, Shielding Internet Users from Undesirable Content: 
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They blocked out breast cancer awareness sites.  There was a great 
uproar among their subscribers and the content providers about 
that. 
It is very, very difficult to do this.  The notion that you can 
hold the Internet service provider liable for all the billions of words 
and images that are on the Internet is just not realistic.  It is cer-
tainly not fair or consistent with basic notions of the law, and cer-
tainly constitutional law, in this country. 
MR. PETERS: From my side, I recognize that nobody can 
block out all of this stuff.  But if they can block out most of it, that 
is better than nothing.  I do not want to impose a legal burden on 
America Online or anybody else that they realistically cannot 
comply with.  But if there are some simple things that they can do 
that are within their means, then I think the law ought to require 
those things.  Unfortunately, I think the law must require them be-
cause many would not do so otherwise.  The idea that every child 
has a lovely, perfect parent is a myth.  If things continue to go the 
way they are now, it is not going to get better in our lifetime. 
MS. AFTAB: At the Internet summit,215 the ISPs and the on-
line service providers received some substantial criticism.  There 
are hotlines that have been set up with both the United States Cus-
toms Service and the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children, which maintains a web site as well.216  You can report 
what you think is already illegal.  If you find obscenity that you 
think violates the law, you can report it.  The ISPs or the on-line 
service providers have agreed to try to limit access to sites that are 
clearly illegal, such as child pornography sites and a lot of other 
sites.217  So if it is pointed out to them, they will limit access; they 
 
The Advantages of a PICS Based Rating System, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 866, 908 (1997); 
Ann Beeson, Top Ten Threats to Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 10, 12 
(1996). 
215. The “Internet Online Summit:  Focus on Children” was held in Washington, 
D.C., from December 1 to 3, 1997.  See Bob Dart, Summit Takes on Net Safety; Internet 
Summit Focuses on Kids, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 28, 1997, at B1. 
216. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children can be accessed at 
www.missingkids.org.  See Carolyn Jabs, Parents’ Online Survival Guide—Our Tips Will 
Show You How to Keep Kids Safe Every Time They Go Online, HOME PC, Mar. 1, 1998, 
at 89. 
217. In 1996, the Internet Service Providers Association (“ISPA”) and London 
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have agreed to do that. 
I do not know that I want AOL or Steve Case218 deciding what 
I should be seeing either, or judging what is or is not obscene.  I 
think that is what our courts are supposed to do.  In any case, once 
we point out something that is legally impermissible, they will re-
spond.  They have agreed that they will. 
MR. SIMS: Just picking up on a couple of themes mentioned 
earlier, I think that Ms. Aftab just emphasized a rather interesting 
proposition, namely, that as a parent she should have the right to 
make her own decisions about how her children react to indecency 
in the world and on the Internet.  And, by the way, I want to point 
out that her point very much picks up the theme of the liberal dis-
sent in the Pacifica case:219  that some parents might want their 
children to hear the “seven dirty words” monologue220 and similar 
talk. 
On the other hand, Robert Peters emphasized the imperfection 
of many parents.  I want to specifically ask you, Mr. Peters, given 
that situation, and assuming that you can identify what indecency 
is, does society have a greater interest than the parents in protect-
ing children from indecency on the Internet? 
MR. PETERS: Well, in Ginsberg v. State of New York221 and in 
Pacifica,222 the Supreme Court recognized two valid interests re-
garding children; one was assisting parents,223 and the other was 
protecting children.224  This second issue recognizes that, in some 
 
Internet Exchange (“LINX”) formed the Safety-Net Foundation (later renamed the Inter-
net Watch Foundation) to monitor illegal material on the Internet.  The ISPA stated that 
members would remove illegal material when they are aware of it.  See Guy Clapperton, 
Net Working on Porn Laws; Guy Clapperton Looks at the Methods Being Used to Screen 
Out Online Obscenity, OBSERVER (London), Mar. 9, 1997, at 13. 
218. Chief Executive Officer, America Online, Inc.  See Case: Summit, Politics Do 
Not Mix, MULTIMEDIA DAILY, Dec. 2, 1997. 
219. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
220. Id. at 770. 
221. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
222. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
223. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). 
224. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757-58 (Powell, J., con-
curring). 
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cases, the parent may be the enemy of the child.  For example, 
where there is sexual abuse and other problems in the home.  The 
government’s concern cannot be limited to assisting parents, given 
the fact that many parents have bigger problems than their children 
do. 
So I agree that the answer to the parents who do not want to re-
strict their children’s access to the Internet is to open the door to 
them.  It is a tough problem, and certainly it is another thing that 
came up in Reno.225  The judges were very concerned that the 
prosecutors were going to go after good, liberal parents who did 
not believe in screening.226  Now, you cannot get prosecutors to go 
after organized crime controlled adult obscenity businesses, but 
admittedly, in theory, going after good parents could happen.  It is 
hard for me to believe that any prosecutor in this country, certainly 
at this point, would go after an honest, sincere, and loving parent.  
But the Court was very concerned about that. 
So I suppose the compromise requires some defense for parents 
who allow their children access to sites on the Internet which most 
parents would not approve of.  Hopefully, that defense would not 
allow bad parents who use pornography to sexually abuse their 
children, but presumably there are other laws that would apply in 
those instances. 
As part of the compromise we would need this parental de-
fense.  Personally, I am very liberal when it comes to parental au-
thority, except in the worst cases.  So if you did not want to limit 
your child’s access to the Internet, I would not bat an eyelash.  I 
think that is the answer to the parental conservatives. 
MR. STEINHARDT: Let me talk as a parent.  Actually, Parry 
Aftab and I are about the same age, but my children are younger.  I 
have a fifteen-year-old and a nine-year-old.  My fifteen-year-old is 
a sophomore in high school, and gets remarkably difficult home-
 
225. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336-37 (noting that, even if it were technically feasible to 
block minors’ access to newsgroups or chat rooms that contain indecent or offensive ma-
terial, it would be impossible to allow them access to the remaining, non-indecent con-
tent). 
226. See id. at 2348 (“Under the [Communications Decency Act], a parent allowing 
her 17 year old to use the family computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, 
in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term.”). 
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work assignments that scare the heck out of me. 
My wife and I have made very different choices for our chil-
dren because of their age differences in terms of their Internet ac-
cess.  Basically, for our fifteen-year-old we get complete Internet 
access.  I have no doubt this fifteen-year-old is interested in sexual 
issues, and I have no doubt that he is clever enough and smart 
enough to access sexual material.  I encourage him to access mate-
rial, for example, about safe sex practices.  He is probably more 
likely to absorb information accurately on-line than he is going to 
absorb it from his parents, given his age. 
For our nine-year-old, we do subscribe to America Online and 
we do use some of the parental controls.  But I must tell you that I 
do it reluctantly, not so much because I think that parental controls 
are a problem as they relate to a nine-year-old, but because the 
truth is that I do not think there is a great chance that my nine-year-
old is going to be harmed on-line.  First of all, she is exposed to 
very, very little on-line that she does not go after or that she does 
not have some adult help her get to.  Second, as I see this parade of 
other nine-year-olds come through my home with sprained ankles, 
broken arms, and broken wrists, all caused by ice skating or roller 
blading, I actually think she is a lot safer on-line.  I think that our 
medical premiums are reduced by encouraging her to stay on-line, 
rather than go out roller blading.  I am afraid we are just not that 
worried about it when it comes to my still-very-young daughter. 
On the other hand, I am worried about my fifteen-year-old.  He 
is interested in sex; I know that.  But I am concerned about the 
possibility that he is not going to be able to do his homework if we 
employ parental controls.  I do not want him blocked from the 
Quaker web site or the American Association of University 
Women web site.  I certainly do not want him blocked from the bi-
ology department of Yale University when he is struggling with his 
biology homework.  The Internet is his primary source of research 
now, as it likely is for most of his fellow students. 
I am willing to take whatever slight risk there is on the Internet 
as a trade for the access that he has to a wealth of information, 
which would be otherwise inaccessible to him: information that 
certainly was inaccessible to me when I was his age. 
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MR. SIMS: Thank you.  Were there any questions from the au-
dience? 
QUESTION: A question for Mr. Peters.  Is the child safety is-
sue a self-curing problem?  In time, when the children of this gen-
eration become parents, because they will be far more expert than 
their parents in regard to the Internet, won’t they have the where-
withal and the knowledge to control their children’s access? 
MR. PETERS: Well, I’ll tell you, as the years go by, children 
will be able to access the Internet outside of the home more and 
more easily.  I do not know how any system can depend totally, ut-
terly, solely on parental use of home screening technology.  I do 
not see how that is going to solve the problem. 
Also, in the meantime, until this generation grows up, we will 
just throw the children who do not have all-wise parents to the 
wolves. 
QUESTION: If in fact there are sufficient laws, Mr. Peters, to 
already control obscenity and the obscenity standard seems usable, 
if not perfectly defined, why bother legislating specifically for cy-
berspace?  The law is there already.  If it is obscene, you go after 
it.  If it is child pornography being sent to children, you go after it. 
MR. PETERS: Well, I will tell you one practical problem.  We 
have not had an obscenity prosecution in Manhattan227 for almost 
two decades.228  So if the idea is protecting children by enforcing 
the adult obscenity standard, we'll be abandoning many children 
who do not have perfect parents. 
I shouldn't use the phrase “even in New York,” but I think it is 
true that, even in New York City, if it were proved that some adult 
book store were selling hard-core porn to children, the prosecutor 
would enforce the harmful-to-minors law.  But that does not apply 
to the Internet. 
 
227. One of New York City’s five boroughs, Manhattan comprises the whole of 
New York County. 
228. The last successful obscenity prosecution in Manhattan occurred in 1973.  See 
People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314 (1973).  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an 
obscenity conviction from the Supreme Court in Bronx County, New York, and the Ap-
pellate Division for the First Department in 1980.  See People v. Hearne, 415 N.Y.S.2d 
625 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 50 N.Y.2d 919 (1980). 
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QUESTIONER: Why not? 
MR. PETERS: When you are dealing with a harmful-to-minors 
law in a medium where you might limit adult access, you have a 
First Amendment issue.  You do not have that in an adult book-
store because clerks can easily check for identification. 
MS. FANTINO: How many do?  I bet there is a fifteen-year-
old child in Iowa somewhere that is buying Screw magazine or 
Hustler magazine.  And you are telling me his parents know about 
it?  Really, if children want to access pornography, they are going 
to do it whether they live in some Mormon town or whether they 
live in New York City, and they are going to do it whether they 
can hold it in their hands or whether they can scan it with a mouse. 
MR. PETERS: Well, I tell you, that rationale would say that we 
should repeal all laws that protect children against pornography, 
and I do not think that is going to happen.  I grew up in an area 
where there were laws against selling alcohol to minors.  Admit-
tedly, those who wanted to get a drink got a drink.  But from my 
experience, it was pretty much limited to the rebels. 
MS. FANTINO: Bob, you never looked at a copy of Penthouse 
when you were a child? 
MR. PETERS: Penthouse may have been after my time, be-
lieve it or not. 
MS. FANTINO: No.  It is over twenty-five years old. 
MR. PETERS: I am forty-nine, so when I was a child it was 
not there.  Playboy was around.  I saw pornography when I was a 
child, and in my opinion it did not help me. 
MR. KURNIT: It doesn’t seem to have hurt you. 
MR. PETERS: I don’t want to get into my personal life, but my 
observation on the effects of pornography is that the average per-
son looks at it and pretty much goes on to other things and that is 
the end of it.  But I think real-world experience will show you that 
many people will become addicted to pornography.  It usually be-
gins when they are children.  That is the reason why we like to 
limit children's access. 
To some extent, many laws that would help kids are not rigor-
ously enforced.  But this does not mean that we should remove 
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those laws from the books.  I do not see law as the whole answer, 
but I am glad it is there to punish the person who knowingly does 
what is wrong. 
QUESTION: When I was a child, my father absolutely forbid 
me from dialing any of those 976 dial-a-porn numbers, and that is 
why I did it.  How come that analogy does not transcend into the 
Internet?  If you are a parent and you tell your child not to look at 
those type of web sites, isn’t that the parent’s responsibility? 
MR. PETERS: Again going back to the real world before the 
Internet, every loving, perfect parent would say to her child, “Now, 
Johnny or Janine, you are not to go and buy those pornography 
publications.”  That would have been the end of it.  We wouldn’t 
have needed any laws that made it unlawful for shop owners to sell 
pornography to children.  But for some reason our forefathers con-
cluded that perfect parents, instructing their children in an effective 
way, would not always provide the protection.  So we made it a lit-
tle harder for children to get pornography; we made it harder for 
them to drink under age; we made it harder for them to smoke un-
der age.  It’s a tough battle. 
The same thing is true of drugs.  I think we might need to re-
fine our approach a little bit, but making drugs legal to sell is not 
the answer to it. 
MR. SIMS: I see that we have a question from one of the Jour-
nal editors. 
MR. GARNER: I’m Robert Garner, managing editor of the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Jour-
nal.  I would like to revisit a much narrower topic mentioned ear-
lier: the Virginia libraries that restrict the content that they ac-
cepted from the Internet for their public.229  Why is that viewed as 
a problem?  Libraries do not have to buy every book that is pub-
lished, so why is an Internet content restriction not analogous to 
the library not buying every book that is sold? 
MR. STEINHARDT: It is a very different issue.  Librarians 
now in the world of books do make content decisions, but they 
 
229. See David Nakamura & Justin Blum, Va. House Takes Page From Black’s 
Book, Passes Internet Controls, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at V2. 
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make content decisions because they are limited both by physical 
space in their library and also by their financial resources.  For the 
most part, publishers do not give away their materials to libraries. 
The Internet is very different, of course.  Once libraries pay for 
access, they essentially have access to the entire world of informa-
tion that is on the Internet.  The Loudoun County, Virginia case230 
involves access limitations not only for minors but also for adults, 
and it has been limited by the use of the X-Stop software,231 which 
filters to an extraordinary degree and cannot be overridden: even 
by adults.  That is a case in which I think my side is going to be 
victorious.  It is a case in which the library is engaging in the worst 
kind of content discrimination.  The library is prohibiting adults 
from accessing material to which they have a constitutional right in 
the name of protecting children from material.  But the library is 
using methodologies that have nothing to do with children, and 
which are aimed at adults as well.232 
MR. GARNER: Why is the library case not representative of 
the distinction between Rust v. Sullivan233 and Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of the University of Virginia?234  Isn’t the action of 
the Virginia public libraries analogous the federal government’s 
abortion counseling restriction in Rust?  Isn’t the government buy-
ing a service, and doesn’t it then have the right to choose what ser-
vice it is buying or the parameters of the service? 
MR. STEINHARDT: I do not think that the government has 
the right to engage in content-based discrimination.  That is what 
 
230. Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudon County Library, No. 
Civ. A. 97-2049-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 1998). 
231. See id. at *36-37; see also Sewall Chan, Web Debate at Library on Shelf for 
Now; Decision on Limits Pushed to December, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1997, at V3 (defin-
ing X-Stop as “a software program that blocks specific Web addresses based on [per-
sonal] preferences). 
232. See Mainstream Loudoun, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *38 (noting that the 
governmental interest in protecting children does not justify an unnecessarily broad sup-
pression of speech). 
233. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that government may make content-based 
choices when the government is the speaker or when the government enlists private enti-
ties to convey its own message). 
234. 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan by drawing a line 
between conditions imposed on government-funded private speech and conditions im-
posed on the government’s own speech or that of its surrogates). 
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the government is doing here in an extremely crude way.  The odd 
thing here is that much of the material blocked by the X-Stop soft-
ware is available on the library shelves.  You can get it in its 
printed form.  The library cases, which have always turned on the 
question of scarce resources in both space and dollars, just do not 
apply here because there are no scarce resources.235 
And in this case there certainly are less-restrictive alternatives 
that the libraries could have taken.  For example, they apply this 
practice only to minors.  Instead, what they have done in the name 
of protecting minors applies to adults as well.  If they were con-
cerned about passers-by seeing what was on the screens, they 
could have put in privacy screens.  They could have done any 
number of things without engaging in this sort of crude form of fil-
tering. 
Another interesting sideline to this is even in Loudoun County, 
Virginia, which is in the midst of the Moral Majority country, the 
vote on the library board was very close: 5-4 to install the Internet 
filtering software.236  So even in that fairly conservative jurisdic-
tion, they saw the peril. 
MR. SIMS: I am enjoying this.  I would love to continue, but 
we are out of time.  I want to personally thank our very fine panel-
ists for a stimulating, interesting, and informative panel.  I would 
also like to thank the editors and staff of the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for this setting up 
this fine program.  On behalf of the Journal, I also want to thank 
all of you for attending. 
 
235. See Mainstream Loudoun, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *33-35 (noting that 
by purchasing Internet access, the library has made all Internet publications accessible to 
patrons); cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) 
(noting that budgetary concerns force school libraries to choose some books over others). 
236. See Mainstream Loudoun, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4725, at *2 (naming five of 
the library board members as defendants). 
